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Predicting cyberattacks using machine learning has become imperative since cyberattacks have 
increased exponentially due to the stealthy and sophisticated nature of adversaries. To have 
situational awareness and achieve defence in depth, using machine learning for threat prediction 
has become a prerequisite for cyber threat intelligence gathering. Some approaches to mitigating 
malware attacks include the use of spam filters, firewalls, and IDS/IPS configurations to detect 
attacks. However, threat actors are deploying adversarial machine learning techniques to exploit 
vulnerabilities.  This paper explores the viability of using machine learning methods to predict 
malware attacks and build a classifier to automatically detect and label an event as “Has 
Detection or No Detection”. The purpose is to predict the probability of malware penetration and 
the extent of manipulation on the network nodes for cyber threat intelligence. To demonstrate the 
applicability of our work, we use a decision tree (DT) algorithms to learn dataset for evaluation. 
The dataset was from Microsoft Malware threat prediction website Kaggle. We identify probably 
cyberattacks on smart grid, use attack scenarios to determine penetrations and manipulations. 
The results show that ML methods can be applied in smart grid cyber supply chain environment 
to detect cyberattacks and predict future trends.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The unpredictable nature of cyberattacks and the cascading effects of cybercrimes on the 
business system have made it difficult for organizations to predict endpoint attacks. ML assist in 
recognizing attack patterns using datasets of previous attacks to predict future attacks trends and 
responses [1]. Endpoints are the third-party vendor systems, workstations, servers, handheld 
mobile devices and AMI devices.  Malware attacks have intensified by the distributed nature of the smart 
grid in supply chain systems. Adversaries are using cyberattacks such as cross site scripting, cross 
site request forgeries, session hijacking and remote access trojan attacks to commit cybercrimes 
such as modification of software, manipulating of online services, manipulations electronic 
products, diverting e-products and other security misconfigurations. Ford and Siraj 2015, 
highlighted different issues in the applications of machine learning in cybersecurity by detecting 
phishing, network intrusion, testing security properties of protocols and smart energy 
consumptions profiling [2].  
 
Machine learning techniques are applied in a cybersecurity environment to predict network 
intrusions detections, malicious codes detections, amount of suspicious transaction, electric 
power fraud anomaly detection, substation location frauds, and spam filtering for spear phishing 
attacks, as well as determine the probabilities of attacks.  We could use ML to detect anomalies 
in HTTPs requests such as XXE, XSS, SSRF attacks in communication networks, authentication 
bypass in password setting and SQL Injection in a database system. Soska and Christin 2014, 
applied ML techniques to automatically detect vulnerable websites before the turn malicious [3]. 
Canali et al. 2014 applied ML techniques to detect the effectiveness of risk prediction based on 
browsing behaviours [4]. Hinks et al. 2015 use ML techniques on various classification algorithms 
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to learn dataset to detect power system disturbance and cyberattack discrimination [1]. Mohasseb 
et al. 2019 applied ML techniques to analyze a dataset from various organizations to improve 
classification accuracies [5]. These works are important and contribute to detecting and predicting 
cyberattacks using machine learning in the cybersecurity domain. However, there is a limited 
focus on smart grid vulnerability from supply chain perspective, and specifically on threats relating 
to inbound and outbound chain contexts that need adequate detection to improve smart grid 
security control and decision makings.  
 
In this paper, we use ML techniques to learn datasets and build a classifier to automatically 
detect and label an event as Has Detection or No Detection. The rationale for choosing the DT 
algorithm is that DT represents the major supervised schemes for ML in network security. We use 
a dataset from Microsoft malware prediction [6] for our work. To demonstrate the effectiveness of 
our approach, we adopt the decision tree algorithm to evaluate our data sets based on the attack 
classifications.  
 
The main contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, we identify probably cyberattacks on the 
smart grid and the vulnerable sports that could be exploited through penetration and 
manipulations base on the telemetry dataset. Secondly, we use attack scenarios to determine the 
penetration and the manipulations for the threat predictions on the endpoint nodes. Finally, we 
use ML techniques to learn the dataset and use the DT algorithm to predict whether the endpoint 
nodes can classify if the nodes can detection cyberattack or not using Has Detection or No 
Detection. The results show that ML algorithms in Decision Trees methods could be applied in 
smart grid supply chain predictive analytics to detect cyberattacks and predict future trends.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of related works in 
the machine learning in smart grid supply security domain and the existing classification 
algorithms. Section 3 considers our approach to evaluating the ML techniques to learn dataset 
and the classification algorithms for smart grid supply chain, CPS smart grid infrastructure and 
the vulnerable spots and probable attacks scenarios. Further, it discusses the data 
representation, feature descriptions and extractions as well as the classification algorithm. 
Section 4 presents the implementation of the machine learning simulation process, performance 
evaluation on the classifier and determines the average accuracy of the model and predict the 
probability of penetrations on the endpoint nodes. Section 5 presents the results and analysis of 
the DT that predicts the cyberattack initiated and the cybercrimes committed or not. Further, we 
provide discussions of the several observations identified in the study. Finally, section 6 presents 
a conclusion of the study, comparisons of existing works, limitations and future works.    
 
2. RELATED WORKS 
This section reviews related works and the state of the art of cybersecurity in machine learning 
predictions, decision tree classifications and how they are related to malware attacks on CPS 
environment. That includes identification of previous classification approaches, leveraging the 
classifications of malware with a specific data set and prediction task used.  Sharmar et al. 2012 
proposed an ML technique for detecting worm variants of known worms in real-time systems [7].  
Tsai et al. 2009, proposed a review of the intrusion detection system by using ML techniques and 
various classifiers on the intrusion detection domain [8]. Wang et al 2014. Performs an empirical 
study of adversarial attacks against ML models in the context of detecting malicious 
crowdsourcing systems [9]. Bilge et al. 2017, proposed a risk teller system that predicts cyber 
incidents by analyzing malicious files and infection records according to the endpoint protection 
software installed to determine machines that are at risk [10]. Canali et al. 2014 performed a 
correlation analysis on the effectiveness of risk prediction based on user browsing behaviour by 
leveraging ML techniques to provide a model that can be used to estimate the risk class of a 
given user [4]. Barros 2015 posits that decision threats and induction methods in general, arose 
in machine learning to avoid acquisition bottleneck for expert systems [11]. Villano, 2018, 
proposed a method of classification of internet logs using ML techniques by correlation and 
normalization process and evaluated the DT algorithm that could predict an attack or not [12]. 
Soska & Christin 2014, proposed a complementary approach to automatically detect vulnerable 
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websites before they turn malicious by design, implement and evaluate a novel classification 
system which predicts whether a given website could be compromised in future [3]. Hinks et al. 
2014, proposed an ML technique for power system disturbance and cyberattack discrimination by 
evaluating various ML methods for an optimal algorithm that is accurate in its classifiers to predict 
disturbance discriminators and implications [1]. Yavanoglu et al. 2017, proposed a review of 
cybersecurity datasets for ML algorithms by analyzing network traffic and detecting abnormalities 
used for experiments and evaluation methods considered as baseline classifiers for comparisons 
[13]. 
 
2.1 Decision Trees 
Decision Tree is used as a method in ML for classification and regression in large and complex 
data in order to discover patterns. DT is built as a tree structure to classify instances of an attack 
by plotting each malware attack attributes from the top and down to its root. Each branch of the 
dataset is broken down into subsets to represent a choice of possible values for the attributes of 
output, and each leaf represents a decision. DT is used in supervised ML for classification and 
regression [11]. DT inference process starts at its root and proceeds to the leave. DT processes 
include splitting, pruning and tree selection [14]. Splitting includes partitioning the data into 
subsets, pruning includes the process of reducing the tree by turning some branch nodes into leaf 
nodes, and tree selection involves finding the smallest tree that fits the data.  Each attribute is 
assigned a node, and in the leaf are the probable outcome or state. DT uses inductive inference 
as a method to arrive at a conclusion based on the independent input and using the dependent 
values as attributes. There are several approaches to DT algorithms such as J34, C4.5, C5.0 cart 
and others. We used C5 method to identify which attribute was the root of the tree [15]. Figure 1 

















FIGURE 1: Decision Tree. 
 
2.2 Decision Tree Selection Criteria 
Decision Tree uses various algorithms for inferences to arrive at a conclusion, therefore, it is 
required to have a selection criterion with certain characteristics that we can use to determine the 
challenges. The characteristics include: Challenges originating from the classification of the data 
sets could be numerous. For instance, identifying attacks that are initiated through Intelligence 
Electronic Devices on smart grid systems or classifying staff salaries based on qualifications, 
skills and experience.  
 
2.3 Rational for Chosen Machine Learning and Decision Tree 
Several algorithms have been used in ML. such as Naive Bayes, SVM, Random Forest and 
Logistic Regression. However, our rationale for chosen DT algorithms in ML is that it provides 
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discrete outputs as the factors are provided by attributed value pairs for strategic management 
decision makings. E.g. Results: Pass or Fail. Cyberattack: Internal or external.  Temperature: hot 
or cold. Outcome: Positive or Negative.  
 
 DT algorithm can identify attributes pairs that were not considered initially in the 
classification such as the source of attack but could work without those attributes to 
minimize inferred errors.    
 DT algorithm can handle datasets that have errors in the attribute values and resolve 
classification errors in the training and test phase. Such as false positives (FP) output 
when network traffic is a normal or false negative (FN) when network traffic is under 
cyberattack. The discrete probability outputs provide results that predict a ‘True or False’, 
‘Yes or No’ and ‘A or B) outcomes.   
 
3. APPROACH 
This section considers our approach to evaluating the ML techniques to learn dataset and the 
classification algorithms for the smart grid supply chain. We discuss the smart grid infrastructures 
and the vulnerable spots, attack scenarios and the ML approach. The rationale for the ML 
approach using DT to predict an attack is to determine the causal relationships amongst the 
cyberattacks on a smart grid supply chain system and attempt to predict the malware using 
probability distribution methods. Then based on the classification analysis, we evaluate the 
predictive method with appropriate metrics to verify the organizational goal and security goal as 
we seek to determine whether a specific cyber threat phenomenon is likely to appear in a similar 
event. There are some algorithms for building decision trees such as ID3 and C4.5 formula and 
others [15]. We discuss the ML methods used, as well as the approaches used for the malware 
prediction. 
 
3.1 CPS Smart Grid Infrastructure 
The CPS smart grid infrastructure in figure 1, integrates application and network systems using 
Intelligence Electronic devices (IEDs). Refer IEC 61850 [16] The application system uses the 
IEDs, Sensors, Actuators and other communication devices for power generation, distribution, 
and transmission. The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Programmable 
Logic Controls (PLC) establishes communication protocols with the Remote Telemetric Units 
(RTUs) for monitoring and gathering real-time data across various substation. The network 
system provides interconnectivity between substations, automation systems and field devices 
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FIGURE 2: Smart Grid System Infrastructure and Vulnerable Spots [19]. 
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The adversary could cause cyberattacks (penetration) and cybercrimes (manipulation) on the 
CPS. Cyberattacks such as remote access trojan, spear phishing, cross site scripting or session 
hijacking on the intelligent devices and communications networks to penetrate firewalls, IDS/IPS 
or the IEDs. After penetrating the system, the adversary could commit cybercrimes by 
manipulating the system to cause resonance attacks, DDoS attacks, IP theft, ID theft, intellectual 
property theft as well as take command and control to monitor and control the core business 
processes and operations. We include these attack scenarios in the analysis to determine the 
validity of the penetration and manipulations in real-time. 
 
3.2 Attack Scenarios 
We identify various attack scenarios for the study that will assist in the feature selection process 
as follows. 
 
 Network Attack: An XSS or session hijacking attack on the CSC network may provide 
access to alter the smart metering system, change configurations using distance 
protection scheme to bypass controls in order to manipulate the software in the meter, 
prevent the system from recording accurate purchases or billings.   
 Spyware Attack: The attacker could insert spyware or deploy a  ransomware attack 
remotely to shut the systems down when the antivirus is outdated, and the software is 
unpatched, and consequently affect the prepaid card settings change the configurations 
using distance protection scheme so an attacker can manipulate and prevent accurate 
readings from valid purchases.   
 Ransomware Attack: The attacker could use reconnaissance and social engineering 
tactics to gather intelligence and subsequently initiate a spear phishing attack on targeted 
users to shut the system down until a ransom is paid.  
 Software Manipulation Attack: Most organizations fail to change the hard-coded 
password after buying software off the shelf. The attacker could deploy session hijacking 
techniques to exploit this vulnerability using advanced persistent threats and command & 
control techniques to manipulate the system and consequently cause cybercrimes such 
as intellectually property theft, ID theft and industrial espionage.  
 DDoS or Data Injection: Attacker deploys DDoS attack that could consequently cause 
voltage surges by inserting a rootkit into the OS server to cause resonance attack on the 
smart grid components for the power system to oscillate.     
 Island Hopping attack: On the CSC systems, vendors are more susceptible to 
cyberattacks, and the perpetrators are using RAT and Island-hopping attacks to gain 
access to the major organizations on the supply chain.  
 Malware: The attacker could insert malware or spyware in the software that is bought off 
the shelf that gives the developers access to the system whenever users are prompted to 
update their software. That may cause software errors and subsequently lead to 
application system manipulations.    
  
3.3 Threat Prediction Scenarios 
The threat prediction attempts to investigate two kinds of scenarios that will determine the 
classification result. The scenarios use’s ML techniques to determine the cyberattack initiated and 
the cybercrime committed based on the scenarios and the cyberattacks. 
 
 Scenario 1: what is the probability of the penetration on the endpoint nodes?   
 Scenario 2: What is the extent of manipulation on the various endpoint node? 
 
3.4 Analytical Approach 
To determine the viability of using ML techniques to learn dataset for penetrations and 
manipulations on the CPS, we used the DT algorithm and open source data from Microsoft 
Malware Predictions endpoint protection solutions website [3].  DT provides an efficient and 
nonparametric method that can be applied to a classification or regression task. Further, we used 
supervised learning to train and test the dataset as it provides an accurate prediction of system 
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performance. Using DT hierarchical data structures for supervised learning provides input space 
that is split into local regions in order to predict the dependent variable for decision makings [11]. 
 
3.5 Data Representation 
The data represented Microsoft Windows Machine’s probability of getting infected by various 
families of malware, based on different properties of that machine. The telemetry data containing 
threat report were collected by Microsoft Windows Defender from various MS windows operating 
systems [6]. The properties and machine infections were generated by combining various user 
activities on different organization and vendors. The dataset we used contains 4000 entries.  DT 
algorithm used determines attributes that return the highest information gain that satisfies the four 
uncertainty axions in a confusion matrix and provides the degree of disorganization in the 
dataset. Further, an Entropy formula was used to determine the information gained and the 
degree of uncertainty by separating the positive and negative rates as follows:  
 
Entropy (E) = - a log1 a – b log2 b            (1) 
 
3.6 Feature Extraction 
The feature extraction process involves removing irrelevant columns names or duplicates in the 
dataset to have unique values when training the data. Columns with a higher number of 
duplicates are removed to the correct data. The command is to count the 62 variables and 
remove the irrelevant variables. The output prints 62-8 = 54. (8 columns removed). However, the 
4000 datasets were maintained. The classifier is set to model the features based on the 
importance as well as the F Score. The F-Score was used as the harmonic mean to determine 
the combinations of the precision and recall for plotting the model.  
 
3.7 Classification Algorithm 
The classification phase involves using the ML algorithm to test the dataset for prediction. In this 
phase, the DT model was used to split the data for prediction to determine if each endpoint node 
can detect infections or not. We considered C4.5 or C5 algorithms [15]. The training data is used 
to build the DT model, and the test data is used to determine the dimensionalities of the dataset. 
The rationale for choosing the DT algorithm is that DT represents the major supervised schemes 
for ML in network security. We train the ML algorithm using the training sets. Then compare the 
performance of the algorithm over the datasets.  
 
4. IMPLEMENTATION 
This section discusses the implementation of the machine learning simulation process. The 
purpose of the study is to use the DT algorithm to predict cyberattack and indicate it as Has 
Detection or No Detection. The dataset and the machine malware infections were gathered by 
Microsoft Defender endpoint protection [6]. The dataset corresponds to a machine identifier that 
provides results as to whether the Microsoft endpoints can predict if it can detect malware attacks 
on the nodes. As discussed in section 2, the DT algorithm learns from data sets to approximate 
an ‘if then else’ decision rules and generate branches for the tree nodes and decision nodes.  We 
follow the process below to build the DT classifier for our prediction.   
 
4.1 Description of Data 
The dataset is about a malware attack on Microsoft Endpoint system and such systems can be a 
critical part of the smart grid CSC systems overall business continuity [6]. The dataset was 
designed to meet certain business constraints in relation to privacy and time periods in which 
machine was used. CSC integrates various organizational systems for the business process and 
information dissemination in the CPS environment. The data set containing these properties and 
the machine infections were generated by combining threat reports collected by Microsoft 
Endpoint Protection Solution, Windows Defender. Each row in the dataset corresponds to a 
machine unique identified by a Machine Identifier. Further, the dataset was created to meet 
certain business constraints, both regarding privacy and when the machine was running. Hence, 
the dataset is relevant for our work as it was gathered from global machines that used Microsoft 
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Windows Defender. The rationale for using the dataset for our work is that the dataset does not 
represent Microsoft customers machine only as it has been sampled to include a much larger 
proportion of malware machines. Thus, we used the dataset for our work to determine whether 
the has detection or no detection on various network nodes for threat predictions. Below are 
some of the features from the metadata that are relevant for our work [6]. 
 
 MachineIdentifier - Individual machine ID 
 GeoNameIdentifier - ID for the geographic region a machine is located in 
 DefaultBrowsersIdentifier - ID for the machine's default browser 
 OrganizationIdentifier - ID for the organization the machine belongs in.  
 is protected - This is a calculated field derived from the Spynet Report's AV Products 
field.  
 Processor - This is the process architecture of the installed operating system 
 HasTpm - True if the machine has tpm 
 over - Version of the current operating system 
 OsBuild - Build of the current operating system 
 Census_DeviceFamily - AKA DeviceClass. Indicates the type of device that an edition of 
the OS is intended for desktop and mobile 
 Firewall - This attribute is true (1) for Windows 8.1 and above if windows firewall is 
enabled, as reported by the service. 
 
4.2 Data Preparation 
The dataset represents Microsoft malware prediction events collected from various families of 
malware infections based on different properties of attacks. Windows Defender tool was used to 
generate the threat reports of the malware infections from various Microsoft endpoint protection 
solutions.  [6].   The dataset derived 4000 entries with 64 columns, and each row represents 
different metadata entry. Each row in the dataset corresponds to a machine uniquely identified by 
a Machine Identifier. We used supervised learning to derive the dataset that represented the 
instance of each table and attribute. The rationale is to predict an outcome for future events. The 
variables in the datasets are for each instance to determine whether a malware attack is Has 
Detection or No Detection.    
 
4.3 Feature Selection 
The features for the dataset are split into the partition of the subsets of attacks as indicated in 
table 1. The attack features indicate the categories of attacks grouped. The splitting of the attack 
categories builds the classifications model for the three structure and breaks it down to represent 
the attack features. Further, we pruned the dataset to reduce the size of the tree by turning some 
branches nodes into leaf nodes. For instance, we categorized the attacks based on the threat 
descriptions in the table for us to fit the training data for the classifier and finds the tree that 




Attack Features Threat Descriptions for Probable Cause of Attack 
1 XSS/Session 
Hijacking 
Default Browser vulnerabilities and injecting code in the URL 
or website 
2-5 Spyware/Ransomware Outdated Antivirus/Patches that are not updated regularly 
6-7 Spear Phishing Use Reconnaissance to identify vulnerable spots and attach 
email with a virus 
8-9 Session Hijacking Exploit Unchanged Hard-Coded password in software 
bought off the shelf 
10-14 Rootkit/DDoS Attack on BIOS or attach a virus to a USB key to cascade 
when booting. 
15-20 RAT/Island Hopping Attacks from Vendor systems to gain access to the 
organizational system 
21-28 Ransomware/Malware Exploiting outdated OS versions and encryptions especially 
TLS/SSL 
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29-35 Malware/Spyware Packet injection and Resonance attacks 
36-38 DDoS Exploit IP Address Systems and Packet injections 
 
TABLE 1: Attack Category and Feature Descriptions.
 
4.4 Performance Evaluation on the Classifier  
The performance evaluation on the classifier determines the average accuracy of the models 
when we run the integer values in the cell. The performance of the model will be determined on 
the following values: True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP) and False 
Negative (FN) rates. Further, the FPR and FN will be determined based on the elements. 
  
     (2) 
 
5. RESULTS 
In this section, we present the analysis of the investigation of threat prediction to the two 
scenarios for the classification results. We discuss adversarial ML briefly and how adversaries 
use ML techniques to exploit vulnerabilities. As discussed in section 3.3, the scenarios use the 
DT algorithm to predict the cyberattack initiated and the cybercrime committed.  
 
5.1 Determine the Accuracy of the Threats 
For us to predict the probability of an attack, we need to determine the known and the unknown 
attacks. As listed in Table 1, Known attacks include Malware, Spyware, Ransomware and, RAT, 
Cross-Site Scripting, Session Hijacking, Cross Site Request Forgery. These are the known 
attacks that could be identified. However, unknown attacks are cyber crimes committed after the 
attacks. Here, after gain access using the known attacks, the attacker, using APT and C&C to 
commit cybercrimes such as manipulation during development, manipulation during development, 
altering and changing delivery channels. The extent of these cybercrimes manipulations and the 
cascading impact are unknown and unquantifiable.  
 
Scenario 1: Predict the probability of penetration on the endpoint nodes?   
Determining the accuracy process involves evaluating the threats, and its impacts on the various 
network nodes for understanding and to provide cyber threat intelligence of the causes and 
effects cyberattacks on the organizational goal, the business process, financial impact. Table 2 
presents the performances accuracies of the DT classifier of each cyberattack on various 
endpoints of the network. Using the confusion matrix, we determine the harmonic mean between 
the Precision (P), Recall (R) and F-Score (F).  From the table, XXS/Section Hijacking, spear 
phishing, RAT/Island Hopping attacks predicted a higher probability of the penetration on the 
endpoint nodes with a percentage score of 82%, 75% and 75% respectively. However, the results 
revealed the XSS and Session Hijacking are the most like penetration method to deploy base on 
the predictions. 
 
SCENARIO DT PREDICTIONS 
ACCURACY 83% 100% 
CYBERATTACKS P       R        F RESULTS 
XSS/Session Jacking 0.89   0.41   0.75 82% 
Spyware/Ransomware 0.89   0.58   0.85 87% 
Spear Phishing 0.81   0.37   0.71 75% 
Session Hijacking 0.71   0.39   0.64 65% 
Rootkit/DDoS 0.66   0.37   0.68 55% 
RAT/Island Hopping 0.67   0.30   0.74 68% 
Ransomware/Malware 0.89   0.55   0.71 85% 
Malware/Spyware 0.87   0.58   0.78 84% 
DDoS 0.78   0.36   0.65 66% 
 
TABLE 2: Predicting the Probability of Penetration. 
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Scenario 2: Predict the extent of manipulation on the various endpoint node? 
Predicting the extent of manipulations on the various endpoint nodes after penetrations are very 
challenging due to the invincibility, uncertainty and fuzzy nature of cybercrimes. Further, 
determining the extent of cyberattack propagation and manipulations in an integrated network 
environment posse a major challenger in the cybersecurity discipline. From Table 2:  the results 
indicate that: 
 
 Ransomware, Malware and Spyware predicted a higher probability of manipulations on 
the endpoint nodes with a percentage score of 87%, 85% and 84% respectively after 
determining the Precision and F-Score with a low Recall rate.  
 That indicates that the extent of manipulation in a given event could be high with an 
average accuracy of 85%.  
 The manipulations could result in cyberattacks such as Industrial Espionage, Intellectual 
property theft, Advanced Persistent Threat and Command & Controls.  
 
6. DISCUSSION 
Predicting cyberattacks in real-time is challenging due to factors such as type of OS being used, 
system refresh rates, time zones, running updates and data in transition. Attacks such as 
Ransomware or malware may impact on the system based on the OS being used, the origin of 
the attack and due to the time zone. Threat actors could use adversarial machine learning 
techniques to exploit vulnerabilities in ML threat predictions  
 
6.1 Adversarial Machine Learning 
Adversarial machine learning is a technique used by the adversary to inject malicious input data 
in the dataset during the training and testing phase to manipulate the classification algorithms for 
the model. The technique can be used in supervised learning algorithms for cybersecurity 
datasets to exploit vulnerabilities and compromise performance results of malware detections, 
spam filters and IDS/IPS intrusions when predicting cyberattack trends and predicting the 
probability of fraudulent activities. The adversary could cause an increase in the false-positive 
rates by inserting malicious samples in the test phase to generate wrong classifications rates of 
the sample data. The adversarial machine learning technique could be used to manipulate 
training data to violate security policy, gain knowledge of threat intelligence, adversary 
capabilities and level of manipulations.  
 
6.2 Determining Processor Count for Vulnerable Operating System 
The classification of the malware attack is built based on the type of operating system that is 
being used by the organization. The OS determines the nature of antivirus that can be installed 
and could be exploited on each system and if it can detect malware attacks or not. An outdated 
antivirus within a third-party system could easily be a point of failure if a malware attack is 
initiated from there leading to power loss, power surge, system error or power fluctuations issues.  
Addressing downtime and uptime in the event of failure is critical for all the organizations that are 
integrated on the supply chain. For instance, a redundant array of independent disk (RAID) uses 
multiple hard drives in unique groupings and storage capacity mechanisms to produce a storage 
solution that provides improved throughput, resistance, and resilience. These drivers rely on 
antivirus updates and patches as trusted sources to prevent any compromises. Figure 3 explains 
the ML processor count of the systems and how it determines the speed at which the malware 
attack could occur as well as the extent of propagation in the event of an attack. The X-axis 
determines the process count for the vulnerable OS. The Y-axis determines the number of OS 
that are affected. From Figure 3, we realized that the processor count of 3000 was able to affect 
4.0 systems. Indicating that the region identifier may have fewer systems with a higher probability 
of penetration and manipulation. Thus, exploiting outdated OS versions and encryptions 
especially TLS/SSL raises antivirus protection issues and application interoperability on the 
various network nodes. Users can be lured into a false sense of security by the threat actor 
across deferent platforms to update the antivirus that could lead to heuristic detections or false 
positives.  
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FIGURE 3: Processor Count for Vulnerable Operating System. 
 
6.3 Resolution Rate of Probable Ransomware Attack 
The figure displays the detection rate of the training dataset using the feature description of smart 
screen usage in the CSC environment. The implication of the of our results is that attackers have 
used malware attacks to penetrate the smart screen and inset spyware in the system that turns 
the camera on in the smart screen monitor. With that, the attacker can see everything the victim 
will do, take command and control, leading to cybercrimes attacks such as Intellectual property 
and industrial espionage. Refer to the FLocker mobile ransomware attack on smart screens 
(Duan. 2016).  Further, the attacker could use social engineering tactics such as spear phishing 
to cause ransomware attacks to deface the monitors and cascade to other smart screen systems 
on the CSC. 
 
Ransomware attacks could affect CSC system platforms that use multiple smart screens monitors 
by infecting a single screen and may propagate to others on the monitors with the same network 
nodes and lock the screens during run time. Section 4.1 describes the dataset and how each row 
in the dataset corresponds to a machine unique identified by a Machine Identifier gathered from 
global machines that use Microsoft Windows Defender. The FLocker ransomware infects smart 
screens and avoids detections as the code is always being rewriting to improve its routine 
variants and meet changing trends. When launched, the malware identifies the country ID, the 
machine ID and activates depending on the motives and intents of the adversary. Figure 4 
identifies the vertical resolution rates of the various systems and how the infections propagate 
through the systems during run time. The Y-axis indicates the extent of vertical infections and the 
X-axis indicates the resolution rates of the infected systems. Malware or ransomware that is 




FIGURE 4: Resolution Rate of Probable Ransomware Attack. 
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6.4 Decision Tree Predictions 
The DT in Figure 5 depicts the results of the classifier that predict a Windows machine probability 
of getting infected by attacks listed in table1, based on various properties of that machine.  The 
properties used to generate the DT are, SmartScreen, CountryIdentifier, AVProducts, 
OSInstallTypeNname, TotalPhysivalRam, OsBuildLab, OSWUAutoOptionsName. The Smart 
screen represents workstations. The Country identifier represents the country the Windows 
Operating System is located. According to a report by Controller and Audit General on the 
investigations of ‘WannaCry’ Ransomware Attack in 2017, the attack initially infected the NHS 
system the UK and then propagated to other countries across the world and infected various 
system [18]. The report indicated that the OS antivirus product was outdated hence the attack. 
The objective of the paper is to use ML techniques on a dataset to predict whether the system 
can detect an attack and label that as Has Detection or No Detection. From, the sample dataset 
of 4000, we predict the probability of ransomware attack infection based on the type of OS 
Installed that could lead to the vulnerability of the ransomware infecting the smart screen as well 
as the country the OS is installed and the version.   
 
6.5 Gini Index Based Decision Tree 
The Gini index based decision tree was the calculation for Smart Screen Malware (M) Infection 
Trend.  
 
 If the dataset (D) contains examples from n class, then the Gini index, gini(D) is defined 
as: 
    (3) 
Where pi is the probability of an object being classified to a particular class that infected. 
 If a dataset (D) is split on the root (R) into two sets subsets D1 and D2 the gini index (D) is 
expressed as:  
      (4) 
The Reduction in Impurity for the split in the dataset was calculated as:  
Gini(R) = gini(D) – giniR (D)    (5) 
From the DT algorithm, we calculate the information gained after the malware (M) infection trend 
test is applied on the smart screen for the classification. A weighted sum of Gini Indices was 
calculated using the DT and generated the Has Detection and No Detection tree. 
Figure 6 depicts the DT indicating the results of the gini index used to measure the probability of 
infections of a ransomware attack that may be wrongly classified.  The DT root indicates a smart 
screen rate of <= 6.5 with a split Gini of 0.5 indicating an equal distribution of the dataset. The 
root of the three has an initial dataset of 4000 as the sample size. The DT algorithm split the 
value into two sets: [1973, 2027]. From the analysis, 1973 were identified as has detection, hence 
are not vulnerable to the attacks. However, 2027 were found to have no detection hence 
vulnerable to malware or ransomware attacks. The branch with has detection is indicated as 
(True) and the other with no detection is indicated as (False). identified as has identified as a 
country identifier with the class Has detection, identified the values of 2531 and 1648 from a 
sample size of 3531. A sample size of 2955 has antivirus product installed. However, the total 
physical RAM has no detection rate of 1458. The DT split the sample size further till the values 
were at the threshold. Figure 5 depicts the gini index calculated and information gained after the 
DT test is applied.  
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FIGURE 5: Decision Tree Predictions. 
 
The results from Scenarios 1 and 2 provides cyber threat intelligence as to what could happen in 
the event of a cyberattack without the classifications of the detections rates in Figure 5.   
 
Scenario 1 predicted a higher probability of the penetration’s attacks on the endpoint nodes 
after determining the harmonic mean between the Precision, Recall and F-Score with a 
percentage score of: 
 82% for XXS/Section Hijacking 
 75% for spear phishing 
 75% for RAT/Island Hopping attacks 
Scenario 2, determining the extent of cyberattack propagation and manipulations in an integrated 
smart grid network environment.  The results show that cyberattacks such as Ransomware, 
Malware and Spyware predicted a higher probability of attack propagation and manipulations to 
other systems.   
 
 The results indicate the extent of manipulation to other integrated network systems could 
be high with an average accuracy of 85% in a given event.  
 The extend of manipulations indicates the relevance of the classification of the 
cyberattack. The threat intelligence indicates that it could result in cyberattacks such as 
Industrial Espionage, Intellectual property theft, Advanced Persistent Threat and 
Command & Controls.  
 
6.6 Comparing Our Results with Existing Work 
A significant amount of literature exists in machine learning techniques and classification 
algorithms to learn dataset for performance accuracies in the cybersecurity domain that have 
considered threat predictions. Comparing our results to existing works, we considered works that 
used ML methods from cyberattack penetration and cybercrimes manipulations perspective to 
detect attacks. Hinks et al. 2014, considered an ML technique for power system disturbance and 
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cyberattack discrimination by evaluating various ML methods for accurate classification to predict 
disturbance discriminators and implications [1]. Sharmar et al. 2012 use ML to detect worm 
variants of known worms in real-time [7].  Bilge et al. 2017 applied ML techniques to predict a risk 
teller system for cyber incidents by analyzing malicious files [10]. Canali et al. 2014 used the ML 
method to perform a correlation analysis of the effectiveness of risk prediction based on user 
browsing behaviour [4]. Villano, 2018, applied ML method for correlation and normalization 
process and evaluated the DT algorithm that could predict an attack or not [12]. Soska & Christin 
2014 used the ML approach to automatically detect vulnerable websites [10]. Mohasseb et al. 
2019 applied ML approach for predictive analytics using SVM and Naïve Bayes algorithms for 
evaluation accuracies [5].  
 
Further, various DT algorithms, models and techniques have been implemented using a various 
dataset for building intrusion detections, anomaly detection and threat predictions. Pournouri et al 
(2017) proposed a cyber attack analysis using decision tree techniques to learn an open source 
intelligence dataset for prediction and for improving cyber situational awareness [21].  Patel and 
Prajapati (2018) proposed a study and analysis of decision tree based classification using ID3, 
C4.5 and CART algorithms to learn a dataset to determine the best performance accuracy [22]. 
Moon et al (2017) proposed an intrusion detection system based on a decision tree using 
analysis of attack behaviour information to detect the possibility of intrusion for preventing APT 
attacks [23]. Sarker et al (2020), presented a machine learning intrusion detection system based 
security model called “IntruDTree” that evaluated various algorithms on a dataset by ranking the 
security features according to their importance then build a generalized tree for detecting 
intrusions [24].  Das & Morris (2018) presented a survey of machine learning and data mining 
methods for cybersecurity applications and analytics for intrusion detection and traffic 
classifications in emails by evaluating the various classifications algorithms on a dataset for 
performance accuracies [25].  Balogun & Jimoh (2015) proposed a hybrid of DT and KNN 
algorithms to detect anomaly intrusions [26]. Malik et al (2018) used a hybrid of DT pruning and 
BPSO algorithms for network intrusion detection [27].  Rai et al (2016) proposed C4.5 DT 
algorithm to construct a model for intrusion detection [28]. Yeboah-Ofori & Boachie (2019) 
present a malware attack predictive analytics using various ML Classification algorithms in a 
majority voting for performance accuracies [29].  Ingre et al (2017) proposed a DT algorithm that 
classifies an IDS dataset as normal or attack after the learning and testing the dataset [30]. Relan 
and Patil (2015) used a variant of C4.5 DT algorithm to implement an IDS by considering discrete 
values for classifications [31].  
 
However, none of the works explored the viability of using machine learning methods to predict 
malware attacks and build a classifier to automatically detect and label an event as Has Detection 
or No Detection on smart grid supply chain domain to predict the probability of penetration and 
the extent of manipulation on the network system nodes for cyber threat intelligence and 
situational awareness.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Our work focused on using ML to learn dataset and used the DT algorithm to determine whether 
the classifier can predict an attack and label the attack as Has Detection or No Detection.  In this 
paper, we have used a malware prediction dataset from a well-known source learn the dataset. 
We have used the DT algorithm to model the infections. Although, other algorithms can perform 
the same task that the DT could handle datasets that have errors in the attribute values and 
resolve classification errors in the training and test phase. Based on our result, the precision was 
83% accurate and concluded that supervised learning model performed better in our predictions. 
Description of objects may include attributes based on measurement or subjective judgement, 
both of which might give rise to errors in the values of the attributes. Some of the objects in the 
training set may even have been misclassified. Take, for instance, a malware attack classification 
rule from a collection of cyberattacks events. An attribute might test for the presence of 
propagation of attack that might give a positive or negative reading at some point. However, 
questions remaining to be addressed as to what performance evaluation methods could provide 
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the best performance indicators for threat predictions and cyber threat intelligence gatherings that 
could provide security control mechanisms. There are limitations in our work, such as comparing 
other classification algorithms for predictive analytics due to the invincibility nature of cyberattacks 
and the cascading impacts on other system nodes.  
 
Future Works 
Future research will focus on using ML techniques on various classification algorithms to learn 
the dataset for anomaly detection and to predict cyberattacks trends. The approach will assist to 
determine the best performance metrics, for cyber threat intelligence and predict future trends.  
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